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In an effort to increase crew survivability from catastrophic explosions of Launch Vehicles 
(LV), a study was conducted to determine the best method for predicting LV explosion 
environments in the near field. After reviewing such methods as TNT equivalence, Vapor 
Cloud Explosion (VCE) theory, and Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), it was determined 
that the best approach for this study was to assemble all available empirical data from full 
scale launch vehicle explosion tests and accidents. Approximately 25 accidents or full-scale 
tests were found that had some amount of measured blast wave, thermal, or fragment 
explosion environment characteristics. Blast wave overpressure was found to be much lower 
in the near field than predicted by most TNT equivalence methods.  Additionally, fragments 
tended to be larger, fewer, and slower than expected if the driving force was from a high 
explosive type event. In light of these discoveries, a simple model for cryogenic rocket 
explosions is presented.  Predictions from this model encompass all known applicable full-
scale launch vehicle explosion data. Finally, a brief description of on-going analysis and testing 
to further refine the launch vehicle explosion environment is discussed. 
Nomenclature 
AF = Air Force 
CFD = Computational Fluid Dynamics 
C-J = Chapman-Jouget 
ft = feet 
HOB = Height of Burst 
HOVI = Hydrogen Oxygen Vertical Impact 
K = Kelvin 
lbs = pounds 
LH2 = Liquid Hydrogen 
LOX = Liquid Oxygen 
LSHOE = Large Scale Hydrogen/Oxygen Explosion 
LV = Launch Vehicle 
psi = pounds per square inch 
VCE = Vapor Cloud Explosion 
WSTF = White Sands Test Facility 
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ZND = Zel’dovich, von Neumann, Doering 
TNT = Trinitrotoluene 
 
I. Introduction 
N order to assess crew survivability during an abort from an exploding rocket, the Launch Vehicle (LV) explosion 
environment must be accurately described. This is also true for the assessment of particularly dangerous payloads 
such as those containing radioactive material.  The LV explosion environment can be broken down into three broad 
categories: blast wave, fragmentation, and thermal effects. For many years the typical approach to modeling a LV 
explosion has been to equate a particular percentage of the onboard propellant to high explosive and use the well-
known high explosive curves1 to predict such aspects as overpressure, impulse, and wave speed. Although this method 
is simple and can be useful in certain circumstances, it is known that it does not accurately capture the physics of 
rocket propellant explosions.  For example,  
but virtually all of them [LV explosions] are non-ideal. 3. TNT Equivalency is not a good criterion for evaluating non-ideal 
explosions and should be replaced, once our understanding improves. 4. Scaling laws for accidental explosions will be 
relatively easy to develop once our understanding of non-ideal explosions improves. 5. A considerable amount of work, 
both theoretical and experimental, is needed in this area2. 
and, 
The blast waves from liquid propellant explosions are highly variable, and characterized by low overpressures and high 
impulses near the source.  These blast waves are therefore initially very different from blast waves from an equivalent 
weight of TNT, which should not be used to estimate blast effects closer to the source than the range corresponding to an 
overpressure ratio of about one or two atmospheres.  The use of a TNT equivalent blast wave beyond this range may not 
always be a very good representation of the wave from a liquid propellant explosion, but at the present time there seems to 
be no practical alternative3.  
This is especially true in the near field where crew and sensitive payload survivability needs to be assessed. Since high 
explosives are by definition point-source supersonic combustion events, they predict extremely high overpressures in 
the near field, whereas propellant explosions are large volumes of gaseous material that most likely combust at 
subsonic speeds4, 5.   
Therefore, as an initial step a literature review was conducted in an effort to locate data from full-scale LV 
explosion accidents and tests.  Additionally, trips were taken to several libraries and launch sites to collect data.  The 
goal of the data collection was to build empirical models of LV explosions so that a more accurate model could be 
used for survivability assessment, and to aid in developing improved analytical and numerical models.  Most of the 
empirical data were found in declassified LV accident reports.  The majority of the accident reports came from the 
1960s when the LV industry had a higher rate of explosions.  Currently, approximately 30 accidents were found to 
have applicable documented explosion data (not necessarily overpressure data) 6-29.  Some of this data was as simple 
as a report on the payload survival and some was as extensive as pressure traces, radiometric readings, and hundreds 
of fragment measurements. The LV explosion study was broken into three broad categories: hypergolic rockets, 
cryogenic rockets, and solid rocket boosters.  This paper discusses results for the cryogenic rocket explosion.   
Many documents were found containing data recorded from various tests used to simulate LV explosions.  The 
test series out of NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) called HOVI (Hydrogen/Oxygen Vertical Impact test) and 
LSHOE (Large Scale Hydrogen/Oxygen Explosion) contained much useful data 30-33.  The joint NASA/Air Force (AF) 
test series called Project PYRO22 also delivered a large amount of data.  Documents from about 10 other applicable 
tests were found.  However, most of these contained small quantities of propellant and/or uncontrolled variables, so 
were not as useful. 
Many theoretical and experimental documents were found pertaining to the physical processes of mixing, 
vaporizing, and combusting cryogenic propellants.  These were useful in interpreting the measured blast wave data 
from tests and accidents.  They were also helpful in guiding the construction of our latest liquid hydrogen/oxygen 
explosion model.  Other documents were found which describe the shock physics of combusting gases.  These 
theoretical papers focused on the Chapman-Jouguet (C-J) model 34-36 and the Zel'dovich, von Neumann, and Doering 
(ZND) model 37-40.  Several papers were found that described experiments designed to measure the combustion 
pressure of gaseous hydrogen and oxygen at various mixture ratios and dilutant concentrations.  These were used as 
inputs into the new blast model.  Specific works by Dr. E. A. Farber 41-48 and Mr. E. J. Tomei 49-52 were useful in this 
task. 
Finally, documents were sought that described existing models for cryogenic propellant explosions.  Many 
documents for the standard high explosive or TNT model were found.  Many papers were found that described 
numerical models for various aspects of the vaporizing, mixing, combustion, and propagation processes.  One 
I
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particular model, the vapor cloud explosion (VCE) model by Baker, Tang, and Strehlow 53-56 was particularly helpful 
in understanding the physics of gas cloud explosions and bounding the problem.  
II. History of Payload Survival 
As the literature review was conducted, it became apparent that the LV explosion environment was more 
survivable than the authors and many others had assumed.  In fact, every payload that was in close proximity to a LV 
explosion for which enough data existed to assess its survivability, did indeed survive (see Table 1 and Table 2). It 
should be noted that the payloads listed in Table 1 survived the LV explosion, but not necessarily other events such 
as eventual impact with the Earth. The Space Shuttle Challenger accident is, unfortunately, a good case study.  
According to the joint NASA/DOE/INSRP report 24, 25 on STS 51L the orbiter survived the explosion but was torn 
into major sections by the resulting large-angle-of-attack aerodynamic loads.  The crew compartment remained intact 
with evidence of living crew until it impacted the Atlantic Ocean.  Confirmation of this scenario was confirmed by 
personnel involved in the Challenger recovery and investigation. This underscores the need for more accurate 
explosion models.  If crew survivability is possible, or even likely, then designing the other life-critical hardware so 
that it continues to function after the explosion is extremely important.  Incorrectly assuming that the crew would 
perish if too close to an explosion could lead to taking unnecessary avoidance risks, or leave them without proper 
survival capability after the explosion.  
 
Table 1 List of Payloads Confirmed to Have Survived Launch Vehicle Explosion 
Launch Vehicle Launch Date Payload Reference 
Vanguard TV-3 6 Dec 1957 TV-3 6, 7, 57 
Thor Able I 127 17 Aug 1958 Pioneer 0 58 
Atlas 50D 29 Jul 1960 Mercury Capsule 59 
Atlas 100D 25 Apr 1961 Mercury Capsule 60 
Atlas 17E 17 Jun 1961 Mark 3 Mod 1B RV 61 
Atlas 32E 10 Nov 1961 RVX-2A, No. 424A 62 
Atlas 11F 9 Apr 1962 Mark 4 Mod 1B RV 7, 13,63 
Apollo A-003 19 May 1965 Boilerplate 22 64, 65 
STS 51-L 28 Jan 1986 Challenger 24, 25 
Delta II 7925 17 Jan 1997 GPS IIR 66, 67 
 
Table 2 Summary of Payload Survival Study 
U.S. Only Full-Scale Liquid LV Explosions Studied to Date Pad In-Flight Abort 
Payload survival and nominal operation post-explosion 2 6 2 
Payload remains intact, but no report to confirm nominal operation 0 5 0 
No payload 11 0 0 
Payload survival unknown 17 51 0 
Payload destroyed by explosion 0 0 0 
III. Cryogenic Launch Vehicle Explosions 
A. Empirical Data 
To date, 13 accidents 9, 10, 14, 16, 18-21, 26, 63, 69 and 2 destruct tests with full-scale flight tanks22 have been identified 
where overpressure data have been measured.  The measured overpressures from these 15 launch vehicle explosions 
are shown in Figure 1.  All of these accidents occurred on or near the launch pad.  Therefore, there were many 
explosions (approximately 3 to 12) observed in each accident as the propellants mixed, exploded, re-contacted, and 
exploded again.  Review of LV explosion films have shown that, for in-flight explosions, typically only one to three 
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explosions occur.  Since most of the pressure gauges used to measure the blast wave overpressures in these accidents 
were passive, the data collected are only the maximum values of the largest explosions.  If active gauges had been 
used, then there would be a 
significant amount of data 
portrayed below the maximum 
overpressure data shown in 
Figure 1. 
Due to the state-of-the-art 
and technical understanding at 
the time that the data in Figure 1 
was taken, no attempt was made 
to distinguish the incident 
pressure wave from various 
reflections in the resulting data.  
But, since the blast gauges used 
to measure the overpressure in 
these accidents were close to the 
ground, they measured the 
overpressure within the Mach 
stem of the blast wave.  This 
means that the actual incident 
overpressures from these 
explosions were at least a factor 
of 2 lower than what was 
measured 70.   
Figure 1 shows that at 100 ft. 
(the typical distance a crew capsule would be if the first stage exploded) the measured overpressures range from 0 to 
20 psi.  This means that a crew capsule would experience an incident overpressure of around 0 to 10 psi if it was on 
the rocket when it exploded.  
The red curve in Figure 1 is a 
statistical TNT equivalence 
model used by NASA during 
Project Constellation to predict 
the explosion of the Ares I LV.  
As is typical of TNT models, it 
predicts extremely high 
overpressures in the near field.   
One of the unresolved areas 
of cryogenic propellant 
explosions is the difference 
between LOX/RP and LOX/LH2 
explosions.  It is clear that the 
mixing and combustion of the 
two are different since one fuel 
is cryogenic and the other is not.  
What is not known is whether 
this leads to a practical 
difference in the blast waves 
produced by these two 
propellant combinations.  Some, 
such as High 71, have suggested 
that there is not an appreciable 
difference by showing 
experimentally that “If the ignition delays in LOX/LH2 launch-vehicle failures are not generally greater than the 
ignition delays in LOX/RP-1 launch-vehicle failures, the LOX/LH2 system should not pose a greater explosive hazard 
under severe failure conditions than would a LOX/RP-1 system.”  He also states “It is established experimentally that, 
Figure 1. Measured Overpressures from LV Accidental Explosions.  
 
Figure 2. LOX/RP versus LOX/LH2 Explosion Overpressures.  
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for a given Ac, the explosive yield of LOX/LH2 is similar to that of LOX/RP-1” 71.  However, others, such as Tomei 
49-52, have shown a difference between LOX/RP and LOX/LH2 explosions.   
To examine this issue, all the accident and test overpressure data using LOX/RP and LOX/LH2 propellants of at 
least 200 lbs were studied (see Figure 2).  Approximately 2,500 data points (of which almost all were uncorrected for 
height of burst effects) were used from a few hundred tests and accidents.  With a 95-percent confidence level, no 
difference between the peak overpressure of two propellant types could be shown.  Therefore, a practical difference 
between the large-scale explosions of the two propellants has not yet been found.   
As a singular point comparison, two tests from project PYRO 22 are shown in Figure 3.  The Titan 1 first stage was 
filled with 94,000 lbs of LOX/RP, and the bulkheads between the two tanks was catastrophically ruptured.  The Saturn 
S-IV was filled with a similar weight of LOX/LH2 propellant.  Its common bulkhead was also catastrophically failed.  
The overpressures in Figure 3 from these two different propellants can be seen to follow a similar trend.   
Peak overpressure is insufficient to fully analyze the effect of a blast wave on a structure.  Impulse, or the area 
under the pressure-time curve, is also critical for determining the effect of a blast wave on a solid structure like a crew 
capsule.  The correlation between peak overpressure and impulse from high-explosive (TNT) blast waves is well 
characterized.  However, this correlation for cryogenic propellant explosions is not fully established.  In general, 
propellant explosions can have significantly higher impulses than a TNT blast wave of the same overpressure because 
they can have a higher energy density than high explosives.  However, it remains to be proven how efficient this 
energy is transferred into the blast wave.  The fact that cryogenic propellant explosions typically decay more slowly 
than standard TNT explosions of the same overpressure is evidence of higher impulse.   
Figure 4 shows the measured impulse from two full-scale test explosions 22 and the measured impulse from four 
different explosions 18, 26, 69 that occurred during an Atlas-Centaur pad explosion.  As is typical with most blast 
parameters, the test data are generally more extreme than the actual accident data.  Presumably this is because tests 
are designed to maximize the explosive effect while accidents have many random variables that make ideal blast 
conditions almost impossible to achieve.  Although the data in Figure 4 are limited, it is the only known measured 
impulse from full-scale tests or accidents.  It can be used for assessing capsule, building, and other range structure 
survivability during an explosion event, but caution should be used if such limited data are to be used in such a manner. 
A 4,000-lbm. TNT curve is 
also included in Figure 4 for 
reference.  The TNT curve 
generally follows that of the two 
tests, which used approximately 
90,000 lbs of LOX/RP or 
LOX/LH2.  It significantly over-
predicts the accident data that 
came from approximately 
300,000 lbs of LOX/RP/LH2.  
This illustrates the complexity of 
trying to fit propellant 
explosions to high-explosive 
data and, even more so, fitting 
accident propellant explosions to 
high-explosive data.  
Additionally, this approach is 
further confounded when a 
second parameter, like 
overpressure, is used to fit to 
high-explosive data since the 
overpressure and impulse from the same propellant explosion generally give two different TNT equivalencies.   
Figure 3. Titan I versus Saturn S-IV Common Bulkhead Failure 
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Another key parameter to 
understanding the LV explosion 
environment is the blast wave 
speed, or the speed at which the 
shock wave travels through the 
atmosphere.  This parameter is 
important for two reasons.  First, 
it is a physical indicator of the 
blast physics.  If the blast wave is 
supersonic, then a detonation is 
occurring and the physics of 
detonation should be used to 
model the explosion.  If the blast 
wave is moving at the speed of 
sound, then the explosion has 
either decayed to a weak shock or 
was only a deflagration initially, 
not a detonation.  The second 
reason blast wave speed is 
important is for practically 
assessing crew survivability.  The speed at which the blast wave travels is part of what determines how much warning 
time an escaping capsule will need to get the capsule to a safe distance.  Also, if the blast wave is a sonic event, then 
once the launch vehicle is travelling faster than the local speed of sound in its trajectory the blast wave will be unable 
to transmit through the shock layer and catch up with an escaping crew capsule.  
Figure 5 shows the measured wave speed data from five different explosions 18, 26, 68, 69.  Four of those explosions 
came from the Atlas-Centaur pad explosion.  The green line in Figure 5 is the speed of sound in air at standard 
temperature.  It can be seen that the measured wave speeds beyond about 500 ft. are close to a Mach 1 (or acoustic) 
wave.  Speeds closer than 500 ft. are shown to be faster than Mach 1 at standard temperature.  Since this is the region 
where the fireball and heated air exist, it is impossible to determine whether the wave speed in this region is supersonic 
or simply sonic at a higher temperature.  In general, however, the measured blast wave speeds do not show conclusive 
evidence of a detonation and hint at a purely sonic event.   
B. Cryogenic Propellant Explosion Model 
A fireball and overpressure 
model was developed to identify 
threats to the crew capsule from 
the overpressure associated with 
the shockwave generated in a 
worst-case detonation of a 
stoichiometric mixture of LV 
oxidizer and fuel.  Research was 
done to determine the maximum 
overpressure possible in the 
event of a detonation of a 
stoichiometric mixture of 
oxygen and hydrogen at 100 K.  
The maximum theoretical 
overpressure was found to be 
approximately 480 psi 36 for 
hydrogen and oxygen.  
Experimental values found 
(Table 3) support the findings.  
It is believed that a 480-psi 
overpressure would be unlikely 
in a pad environment; further work is being done to evaluate this theory. 
 
Figure 4. Measured Impulse from Full-Scale LV Accidents and Tests. 
 
Figure 5. Measured Blast Wave Speed from Full-Scale LV Accidents.  
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Table 3. Experimental Hydrogen Detonation Pressures. 
Hydrogen/Oxygen Detonation Pressure 
Author Pressure (psi) 
Edwards 36 397 
Hansen 72 305 
Hord 73 294 
Zabetakis 74 279 
Hydrogen/Air Detonation Pressure 
Kang 75 156 
Kinney 76 181 
Van Wingerden 77 225 
Zeldovich 37 189 
 
The maximum overpressure is associated with a true detonation, a supersonic propagation of the combustion wave 
in the flammable medium.  A deflagration would produce a much lower overpressure, and, as can be seen in Table 3, 
combustion with air would reduce the maximum overpressure even more. These facts can be taken into account from 
a probabilistic standpoint when modeling accidental LV explosions. Also, the initiator plays an important role in the 
type of combustion produced. Usually a detonation can only be produced through the use of a high explosive, a source 
that sends a supersonic wave through the medium.  In general, a deflagration will be initiated when the ignition is a 
low-energy source such as an open flame or an electrical short.  Experimental results from a setup in which identical 
mixtures of hydrogen and air were initiated by either 0.1 kg of C-4 or an electronic spark indicated an order of 
magnitude difference in the resulting overpressure 78. The conditions for a true detonation are unlikely in an LV 
accident.  Few detonation sources exist on an LV, typically just the frangible nuts and the destruct system.  However, 
many low-energy ignition sources will be present in the event of an LV accident—particularly the auto-ignition 
phenomenon discussed below—making a lower overpressure deflagration significantly more likely, as indeed the data 
shows (see overpressures in Figure 6). 
Research performed by Dr. Eric Farber and Wallace Boggs 41-48, 79 indicates that a finite amount of liquid fuel and 
oxidizer can be mixed before auto-ignition occurs, known as the Farber limit.  Their work “confirmed that auto-
ignition occurs and prevents the mixing of more than the ‘critical mass’ and therefore limits the explosive yield to 
several thousand pounds…”  
In the case of LOX/LH2, the 
Farber limit is 
approximately 2,300 lbm.  
For our cryogenic 
propellant explosion model, 
the Farber limit mass was 
assumed to be a 
stoichiometric sphere (or 
hemisphere if on the 
ground) of gases at 100 K at 
ignition, an approximately 
38-ft. diameter sphere (or 
50-ft. hemisphere).  The 
ignition source was 
assumed to be adequate to 
cause a detonation as 
opposed to a deflagration.  
These assumptions defined 
the size of the fast initial 
fireball and the maximum 
possible overpressure 
within the fireball.  
 
Figure 6. Explosion Model versus All Known Accident and Test Data. 
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Research into the maximum overpressure for a stoichiometric mixture of gases classified two stages of fireball.  
The “primary fireball” is driven by the coupled shock and combustion process.  The duration of the primary fireball 
is a few milliseconds and is only visible as a rapidly expanding luminous boundary on high-speed video.  It is strongly 
associated with the maximum pressure and temperature gradients in the event.  The pressure wave (shock) and the 
flame front are coupled and are approximately together in the primary fireball.  The maximum overpressure possible 
in the primary fireball is approximately 480 psi, and the maximum diameter is around 40 feet (LOX/LH2).  The 
transition from primary to secondary fireball is defined as the time when the pressure wave becomes uncoupled from 
the flame front and begins to decay.  The secondary fireball is the structure typically associated with the accident as it 
is easily visible to the naked eye.  No significant pressure wave is associated with the secondary fireball since the 
pressure wave has expanded well outside the flame front.  
Our cryogenic propellant blast overpressure model for hydrogen and oxygen propellants was developed using the 
Farber limit of 2,300 lbs at a stoichiometric ratio.  The propellants were assumed to be gaseous at 100 K and collected 
in a sphere (or hemisphere if on the ground) whose radius was calculated from the ideal gas law.  The sphere of gas is 
the only volume in which the primary fireball can occur.  In the event of an explosion, the maximum theoretical 
overpressure can occur anywhere within the sphere; therefore, it was assumed that the maximum pressure occurs 
everywhere within the sphere to be wholly conservative.  This maximum overpressure was held constant to the edge 
of the sphere and then decayed out to 3,000 ft from the center of explosion.  The decay overpressures versus distance 
were determined using the Baker curves 70, which are empirical curves for bursting spherical gas vessels.  The result 
is shown below in Figure 6. The data points in Figure 6 represent experimental and accident data collected over the 
duration of this task from various documents, covering a time period from 1957 to 2008.  As the understanding of 
blast and shockwave interactions progressed, the data collection and analysis methods also evolved.  This is 
particularly evident in the differences in analysis between the PYRO experiments from the 1960s and the HOVI and 
LSHOE experiments from the 1990s.  The raw data collected in the PYRO and HOVI experiments is of similar 
magnitude, but the HOVI data are corrected for Height of Burst (HOB) effects and are subsequently more reliable and 
accurate. 
Other researchers have developed explosion models that also have a constant pressure initial region and a decaying 
pressure secondary region.  For example, the pioneering work by Baker, Tang, and Strehlow 53-56 has led to a 
commonly used model in the chemical industry called the Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) model.  Also, empirical 
work conducted by John W. Taylor in conjunction with NASA White Sands Test Facility has a similar two-region 
structure 79.   
C. Statistical Application of Physical Model 
To identify overpressures which are more realistic, a basic statistical 
analysis was performed on the free stream* overpressure data from Project 
HOVI and Project PYRO. These two experimental programs are the only 
available cryogenic explosion data between the 500 and 91000 lb. range 
which possess blast sensors within the combustion zone. Furthermore, 
HOVI is unique in that it possesses reported data of both pressure sensors 
and high speed camera data within the combustion zone. Figure 7 5shows 
a graph of the growth rate of the luminous boundary over time for HOVI 
14, the fast initial fireball was taken to end at 40 ms or 12 m diameter 
where there is a distinct change in slope of the luminous boundary.  
This unique HOVI data was used to identify patterns in the response 
of sensors within the reported combustion zone in order to identify similar 
patterns within the PYRO data. This pattern was identified as a region of 
approximately constant pressure in a range of up to 23 ft. from the 
assumed center of explosion.  The average overpressure for these 
explosions is ≈60 psi with a 2-sigma bound of ≈190 psi. Interestingly, this 
analysis also identified that the maximum overpressure was largely a 
                                                          
* Unless perfectly designed and positioned, blast pressure gauges will cause a local increase in the blast pressure where it is 
measured.  This was not widely known until after this phenomenon (sometimes called of Height of Burst) was declassified from 
the nuclear weapon industry.  Nowadays, most experimenters position the sensors and then “correct” or post-process the data after 
the center location of the explosion has been found by high speed camera analysis.  The HOVI test program did this for all the 
measured data and labeled it “free stream” in each set of tabular data.  Project PYRO did not conduct this process.   
 
 
Figure 7. Growth Rate of a Typical 
Cryogenic Propellant Explosion 5. 
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function of mixing time and less a function of propellant mass. This statistical HOVI data was used generate the mean 
(green line) and 95% (red line) in Figure 8. It should be noted that the statistical models are still physical models, not 
merely curve fits to the shown data.  Also, the PYRO and accident data is not corrected for HOB effects and is therefore 
elevated above incident overpressure.   
IV. Additional Studies 
Accident and test data for solid rocket explosions was collected in conjunction with the cryogenic rocket explosion 
data.  This led to a separate physical model for SRB explosions with an abstract accepted at the Joint Army Navy 
NASA Air Force (JANNAF) December 2014 conference.  Additionally, a significant amount of fragmentation data 
such as size, mass, and impact location have been collected for both cryogenic and solid rockets.  This has led to the 
generation of semi-empirical LV fragmentation models, which, when coupled with the appropriate blast model, has 
been used to accelerate each individual fragment and propagate them until they hit the ground for a variety of LVs 
and failure scenarios.  This allows for crew and range survivability studies to be conducted.  Finally, data on the size, 
temperature, and duration of the fireballs produced from the accidental explosions was also collected.  This thermal 
data was used to make simple thermal models which can be used to assess the survivability of heat-sensitive material, 
like escape capsule parachutes.  All empirical data collected in this endeavor, along with originating reports, resides 
in a digital database at NASA and Bangham Engineering, Inc. located in Huntsville, AL.   
As this data was collected and models developed, it became apparent that there was key empirical data missing in 
order to be able to fully characterize all aspects of the launch vehicle explosion environment.  For instance, all tests 
and accidents only collected fragment data down to an arbitrary minimum size/mass.   
Therefore, a few test programs have been initiated to fill the gaps in the data and physical models.  First, two 
cannons with 6 inch and 14 inch bores have been constructed for the purpose of better understanding how LV tank 
fragments are formed and if large numbers (on the order of 10,000 pieces) of small fragments are produced.  These 
two-stage cannons produce a representative blast wave that is then allowed to impact a section of LV tank structure.  
The fragmentation is viewed with high speed cameras and post-test analysis is conducted on each fragment.  Second, 
an unconfined gaseous combustion system has been built to allow for various propellants to be mixed in a variety of 
concentrations with air or pure oxygen, and then ignited.  The ensuing overpressure is measured with blast gauges and 
the flame speed is calculated from high speed camera data.  The combustible gas and blast gauges are both high enough 
 
Figure 8. Statistical Cryogenic Propellant Explosion Model versus All Known Accident and Test Data.
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off the ground that only incident overpressure is measured without any height-of-bust effects.  Data from these tests 
are being used to improve current blast and fragment models.    
V. Conclusion 
As new launch vehicles and launch pads are built, a better understanding of the launch vehicle explosion 
environment can save lives and reduce costs.  To that end, an empirical-based model of cryogenic launch vehicle 
explosions has been developed.  Blast overpressure predictions from this model agree well with all known full-scale 
launch vehicle accident and test explosions.  These new blast predictions are less extreme than have been typically 
predicted by other models such as TNT equivalency.  Indeed, the lower blast overpressure predictions seem to agree 
with historical payload survival rates.  This new model can be used for assessing crew and critical hardware survival 
in the event of a catastrophic explosion.  It can also be used in the design and operation of launch vehicle systems to 
improve survivability.   
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